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A Virtu and the Fortune of Benjamin Netanyahu

The brutal and inhumane attack by the Hamas terrorist group on Israel during the past weekend has stirred international politics. Over the weekend, leaders from the West and East largely condemned the assault, which claimed the lives of several non-combatants. Women were raped and killed, and children and the elderly were decimated by Hamas’s terrorist fervor.

By Rodrigo Bueno Nov 20, 2026 at 21:30 Updated 4 h ago 5 min read
A Virtu and the Fortune of Benjamin Netanyahu

The brutal and inhumane attack by the Hamas terrorist group on Israel during the past weekend has stirred international politics. Over the weekend, leaders from the West and East largely condemned the assault, which claimed the lives of several non‑combatants. Women were raped and killed, and children and the elderly were decimated by Hamas’s terrorist fervor.


Due to the scale and characteristics of the attack, it has been dubbed the Israeli 11/09. The Mossad, one of the world’s best Israeli intelligence services, was taken by surprise last Saturday when Hamas infiltrated the territory via the Gaza Strip. The attacks were coordinated, coming with more than 2,000 aerial missiles and ground combatants destroying everything in their path, including battle tanks and high‑caliber weapons.


The purpose of this article is not to dissect the religious and territorial motives of the conflict, explore potential solutions, speculate about an escalation involving the (official) Iranian regime, or point fingers at a Mossad failure. That’s what the international media are doing well in their coverage; it may seem shocking, but abroad terrorists are called terrorists, not combatants. The aim of this piece is to examine how the conflict can impact Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s position.


To do so, I will use two concepts from Niccolò Machiavelli’s monumental treatise, Princes: Virtù and Fortuna. Virtù denotes a ruler’s ability to adapt to political events to remain in power, while Fortuna represents the unpredictable events that occur in politics and may or may not favor him. I’ll also employ International Political Theory to show which perspective best predicts Netanyahu’s next moves.


In International Relations, there are two antagonistic currents regarding the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy. Liberalism (not to be confused with Smithian economic liberalism) has roots in the post‑First World War period, with Democratic President Woodrow Wilson as a key figure. For liberals, foreign policy is automatically a reflection of domestic politics. Their focus lies more on the individuals involved and their personal, ideological, and leadership traits to predict international behavior.


The rival school, realism, also traces its roots to World War I, where scholars like Edward Carr and Hans Morgenthau declared that International Politics possesses an autonomous field, with its own rules, not merely logical imports from philosophy or political science. Moreover, International Relations is essentially an arena for acquiring, maintaining, and projecting power.


Over the years, a distinguished Dartmouth College professor, William Wohlforth, developed a synthesis of the two macro-theories, called Neoclassical Realism—term previously coined by Gideon Rose but better articulated by Wohlforth. According to this view, international decisions are shaped by two sets of variables: independent (power distribution, military capability, perceived threat) and intervening (domestic elements that influence secondary outcomes such as institutional models, personal characteristics of leaders, and other political, economic, and social powers).


With this third model, we can assess Netanyahu’s position and what may happen to him depending on the conflict’s outcome. It seems implausible that Hamas will achieve its declared goal of annihilating the State of Israel. However, how Netanyahu navigates this period reveals much. In an open war, Israel possesses the power to definitively eliminate Hamas, but ending the group may not be in Netanyahu’s interest. One reason he regained power was the weakness of his predecessor, Naftali Bennett, vis‑à‑vis Arab neighbors, and the fear among the Israeli populace that a weak security policy could destroy the Middle East’s only democracy.


Prior to the attacks, Netanyahu was under pressure from ultra‑Orthodox politicians (internal political‑religious powers) and international capital (external economic powers) over the controversial judicial reform, a policy that would effectively grant the legislature the ability to override Supreme Court decisions. Netanyahu froze the reform after widespread protests from Israeli society and Western allies. Now, with the country under attack and thousands of civilians dead or wounded, opposition to his government should weaken, and international allies may forget their differences to defend Israel.


It is unlikely that Netanyahu will approve the judicial reform amidst wartime pressure and an executive power‑expansion decree—a common practice in crisis periods when democracy is too slow to solve problems—but that maneuver cannot be ruled out, since opposition criticism would be ineffectual while the country faces direct attacks from rivals, and Western allies know they have much more at stake than fighting for a separation of powers in Israel. This “strategic cover‑up” (MEARSHEIMER, 2012, p. 92) could ensure the desired policy’s implementation without sparking major opposition. Such strategies tend to work better in wartime than in peace because the populace becomes more willing to trust the government and what leaders say when the state’s defense is at stake.


We must also remember that Netanyahu faced legal scrutiny, and if he leaves office for any reason there is a real possibility he could end up imprisoned. If Hamas were destroyed, one of the biggest reasons for his hold on power would disappear.


Ultimately, the existence of Hamas is detrimental, even for the Palestinians it claims to “defend.” It is a fundamentalist terrorist group, and Israel has the right to entirely eliminate it. Yet Machiavelli would advise Netanyahu to be less radical, as the threat of Hamas’ actions is part of his political sustenance. A balanced attack is necessary to respond fittingly and inflict enough damage to deter future retaliation—without completely exterminating the enemy.


A decisive victory is best for Israel, but not for Netanyahu.


Bibliography


MAQUIAVEL, Niccolò. The Prince. São Paulo: Hunter Books, 2011.


MEARSHEIMER, John. Why Leaders Lie. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2012.


WOLHFORTH, William. Oxford Handbook of International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Disclaimer: The opinions, analyses, and interpretations expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of its author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Hermenêutica Política.

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Rodrigo Bueno
About the Author

Rodrigo Bueno

Rodrigo Bueno é bacharel em Relações Internacionais pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Mercados e Capitais (IBMEC). Pós graduado em Inteligência e Contra Inteligência pela Associação Brasileira de Estudos de Inteligência e Contra Inteligência (ABEIC/CSABE). Mestrando em Política Internacional ( PUC Minas ). Seu foco principal de estudos é a área da Política Internacional, Filosofia Política e Ciência Política. Na midia já publicou na Gazeta do Povo e no Instituto Mises Brasil. Publicou artigos sobre a História da Política Internacional, Segurança Nuclear, o TNP, e os fundamentos ontológicos e epistemológicos da Ordem Mundial. Publicou artigos pela Editora Dialética sobre o pensamento de Raymond Aron, Samuel Huntington e a História do Conservadorismo. Sócio-Fundador e Membro do corpo editorial do Grupo Hermenêutica Política desde 2020. Analista Internacional e sócio do canal Factual Nacional Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/3687844525565262. ORCID: orcid.org/0009-0003-4507-4943. Researchgate: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Rodrigo-Coimbra-7

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