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Brazil elected a conservative Congress and re-elected Lula: the contradiction that reveals how Brazilians vote

Brazil has just produced one of the most interesting phenomena for contemporary Political Science: it elected a more conservative National Congress, strengthened the right in the Senate, expanded the parliamentary representation of conservative parties and, even so, re-elected Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for the Presidency of the Republic. In the first round, held on October 4, F

By Rafael Emery Gripp Pascoal Nov 21, 2026 at 01:25 11 min read
Brazil elected a conservative Congress and re-elected Lula: the contradiction that reveals how Brazilians vote

Brazil has just produced one of the most interesting phenomena for contemporary Political Science: it elected a more conservative National Congress, strengthened the right in the Senate, expanded the parliamentary representation of conservative parties and, even so, re-elected Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for the Presidency of the Republic. In the first round, held on October 4, Flávio Bolsonaro finished ahead, with 47.03% of valid votes, against 45.16% for Lula. In the second round, on October 25, the result was reversed: Lula was re-elected with 51.79%, while Flávio Bolsonaro obtained 48.21%. At the same time, the PL consolidated its position as the main right-wing political force in Congress, with 121 federal deputies elected and 19 of the 54 seats up for grabs in the Senate.

We are not facing a simple statistical contradiction. We are facing a political question that deserves to be investigated: how can an electorate capable of strengthening the right in Parliament, at the same time, hand over the Presidency of the Republic to the left? The answer may lie, at least partially, in the way Brazilians understand — or fail to understand — the political system itself.

Imagine a voter who votes for a PL deputy because he identifies with his conservative positions. He chooses a right-wing senator because he considers that he best represents his convictions. He votes for a conservative governor because he approves of his administration. But, when he reaches the presidential ballot box, he chooses Lula. Why? Perhaps because he believes that Lula will protect his income. Perhaps because it associates the president with social programs. Perhaps because he rejects the opposing candidate more intensely. Or because he considers that, despite ideological differences, Lula is the best option to manage the country. All of these motivations are possible and can represent conscious choices.

However, there is another possibility: some of these voters may decide each vote in isolation, without fully understanding how the different choices are related in the organization of political power. The vote for deputy, the vote for governor and the vote for president do not follow the same institutional logic. Voters can choose a parliamentarian based on personal confidence, a governor based on administrative evaluation and a president based on economic expectations. When millions of people make choices like this, the collective result can be a power structure that does not correspond to a uniform ideological majority. The problem is not necessarily voting for candidates from different political currents. The problem is not understanding the institutional consequences of one's own choices.

Talking about political ignorance is uncomfortable, but the discussion should not be avoided. However, it needs to be done rigorously. I am not saying that low-income voters are ignorant, that the less educated population is incapable of deciding or that every split vote is irrational. Education, intelligence, political knowledge and judgment are different things. The question is different: how many Brazilian voters actually understand how the electoral system works? How many know how the seats in the Chamber of Deputies are distributed? How many understand that the nominal vote for a candidate for deputy is part of a proportional dispute? How many understand the responsibilities of Congress, the Senate, governors and the Presidency of the Republic? And, most importantly, how many can relate these institutions to the decisions that affect their daily lives?

Brazilian democracy guarantees voters the right to choose their representatives. But exercising this right does not mean that everyone has the same level of information about the functioning of institutions. It is in this space between the right to vote and the understanding of the consequences of voting that one of the explanations for Brazilian electoral fragmentation may lie.

There is a particularly important element in this discussion: the influence of leaders in legislative elections. In many municipalities, voters know the mayor, trust a councilor, follow a community leader or receive a recommendation from someone they consider more informed about politics. This mechanism is not necessarily negative. Trusts help people make decisions in an environment where there are too many candidates and too much information available. The problem arises when the personal recommendation completely replaces the evaluation of the candidate, his proposals and his party performance.

A mayor can ask for votes for a right-wing deputy and obtain support from people who trust him. A councilor can recommend a specific candidate for the Senate. A local leader can mobilize a community around a conservative candidacy. These people can follow the recommendation for legislative positions and subsequently choose a left-wing president. What explains this difference? One possibility is that local leadership exerts influence over the choice of parliamentarian, while national, economic and social factors determine presidential preference. Another possibility is that voters do not realize that they are contributing to the formation of a politically fragmented power structure.

Personal endorsement, therefore, can help explain the choice of specific representatives without necessarily producing ideological alignment among all votes. The question that remains is whether this behavior arises from a conscious choice or from a limited understanding of the political system.

Brazil has different elections for different positions. This characteristic needs to be understood so that we can correctly interpret the 2026 result. The presidential election is majority. The race for federal deputy uses the open list proportional system. Senators and governors are chosen in their own majority contests. This means that voters do not vote for a single list that automatically determines the political orientation of all powers.

The candidate for deputy needs to win votes within a proportional dispute. The presidential candidate must win a majority national election. Electoral incentives are different, and so are the campaigns. Political scientist David Samuels studied how Brazilian electoral rules influence candidates' incentives and the personalization of political representation. Barry Ames, Andy Baker and Lucio Rennó, in turn, investigated the split vote in Brazil and demonstrated the importance of understanding choices for different positions as a phenomenon in its own right.

These contributions help to establish a fundamental point: voting for candidates from different parties is not an anomaly in the Brazilian system. What we need to understand is why this happens, under what conditions it occurs and what its consequences are.

Here we come to the most important point of the discussion. A voter may choose a president hoping that he will execute a certain economic or social program. At the same time, it can elect parliamentarians who oppose this president's main proposals. When the government finds it difficult to approve its projects, who will be held responsible? The president? The deputies? The senators? The parties that make up the government? The opposition?

The answer depends on the specific situation. But there is a previous question: do voters understand which institutions have the competence to make each decision? If a citizen assigns responsibilities to the president that depend on legislative decisions, he may incorrectly evaluate the government's performance. If Congress is exclusively responsible for a policy that depends on Executive decisions, it could make the opposite mistake. Understanding institutional attributions is essential so that democratic demands are directed to those responsible for decisions.

It is possible, therefore, that the fragmentation of electoral choices is accompanied by a fragmentation in the perception of political responsibility. This hypothesis deserves investigation because democracy does not depend only on the possibility of choosing representatives. It also depends on the ability to evaluate what these representatives do.

An elected president does not automatically receive the support of the parliamentary majority. To approve projects, execute part of its program and build majorities, it needs to negotiate with Congress. In a multi-party system, these negotiations may involve different parties, regional interests and political priorities. When the president has a program that is distant from that defended by a significant portion of the Legislature, negotiation can become more difficult.

This can increase the political cost of governance, require programmatic concessions and reduce the ability to fully execute the proposals presented during the campaign. It is in this context that the 2026 result becomes particularly interesting. The right strengthened its parliamentary representation, while Lula won the presidential race. The re-elected president will have to govern in front of a Congress in which conservative forces have great influence.

This does not mean that the government is doomed to paralysis. The right does not constitute a perfectly homogeneous bloc, just as center parties do not necessarily vote uniformly. The construction of majorities will depend on negotiation capacity and the circumstances of each vote. But the scenario demonstrates that winning the presidential election does not mean gaining political control of Congress.

Voters can choose a president to govern and, simultaneously, elect a Parliament that imposes important limits on their agenda. The question is whether he understands this relationship when he casts his vote.

We also need to consider the influence of economic expectations. For a family in a vulnerable situation, the continuity of a social benefit, the possibility of getting a job or the expectation of improving income can be decisive factors in the presidential choice. This behavior does not necessarily mean political ignorance. A person can be conservative in morals, defend liberal positions on the economy and still vote for a left-wing candidate because they believe that their social policies better meet the needs of their family.

Real politics is rarely organized around a single variable. However, we need to investigate whether, in certain contexts, economic dependence and the perceived risk of losing benefits increase the weight of distributive expectations in the presidential choice, even among voters who vote for right-wing representatives for the Legislature.

It is important to distinguish legitimate social policies from clientelist practices. The existence of a public benefit does not prove the purchase of political support, and the receipt of an income transfer does not automatically determine the vote. What interests us is understanding how economic expectations interact with ideological identification, trust in leadership and institutional knowledge.

Perhaps part of the electorate chooses the deputy based on political identity and the president based on economic expectations. If this is confirmed, we will have identified a relevant mechanism to explain the dissociation between electoral results.

I propose to develop a political analysis hypothesis that we can provisionally call the Theory of Electoral Dissociation due to Asymmetry of Institutional Understanding. The central idea is that part of the divergence between choices for different positions can be explained by the difference between the knowledge voters have about the candidates and the knowledge they have about institutions.

Citizens can know the deputy they vote for, trust local leadership and have a defined opinion about the president. But that doesn't mean you fully understand how your choices combine to produce a particular power structure. This hypothesis needs to be tested. We cannot assume that all voters who voted for Lula and conservative parliamentarians were unaware of the political system. Many may have made this choice deliberately.

We need to identify the proportion of voters who understand the institutional consequences of their decisions and the proportion who have difficulty relating different votes. If institutional knowledge is associated with a greater ability to anticipate the consequences of electoral choices, we will have a promising path to develop this theory. The objective is not to judge voters morally, but to understand the mechanisms that guide their behavior.

The 2026 election leaves an important lesson: presidential victory and the composition of Congress represent different dimensions of the popular will. The strengthening of the right in the Legislature did not prevent Lula's re-election. Lula's victory, in turn, did not eliminate the conservatives' parliamentary strength. This combination is perfectly possible within Brazilian democratic rules.

What we need to investigate is why it occurs and what its consequences are for governability, political accountability and the execution of public policies. Political education should not be confused with ideological indoctrination. A politically informed citizen does not need to vote for the right or the left. You need to understand institutions, know the responsibilities of positions and evaluate the consequences of the choices you make.

A mature democracy does not require everyone to vote the same way. It requires that citizens be able to understand the system in which their choices produce effects. The question I leave for reflection is simple: when Brazilians vote for a president and a Congress that defend different projects, are they consciously exercising their right to balance power or are they producing, without fully understanding, a political structure whose consequences they will only realize later?

The answer can help explain not only the 2026 result, but also the functioning of Brazilian democracy. Because, in the end, understanding how Brazilians vote is as important as understanding who they vote for.

References and sources for consultation

AMES, Barry; BAKER, Andy; RENNÓ, Lucio. “Split-ticket voting as the rule: Voters and permanent divided government in Brazil”. Electoral Studies, 2009.

SAMUELS, David. Research on personalization of representation and electoral incentives in the Brazilian political system.

ABRANCHES, Sergio. Studies on coalition presidentialism.

SUPERIOR ELECTORAL COURT (TSE). Data and official balance of the 2026 elections.

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. Results of the 2026 elections and composition of the Chamber of Deputies.

Disclaimer: The opinions, analyses, and interpretations expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of its author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Hermenêutica Política.

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Rafael Emery Gripp Pascoal
About the Author

Rafael Emery Gripp Pascoal

Rafael Gripp é cientista político, pós-graduado em Políticas Públicas, Filosofia, Política e Economia, analista político dedicado à análise das instituições, da representação democrática e do pensamento político contemporâneo e colaborador do projeto Hermenêutica Política.

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